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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Qvantel 
“Qvantel improves business performance with a unique BSS offer-
ing allowing Service Providers to offer consumer and business 
touch points that simply work.” (Qvantel, 2015) 
 
Qvantel is an international 20-year-old IT company that was founded in 1995 as Star-
net Systems. Qvantel acquired Starnet Systems in 2008 and the name was changed 
to its current form. Now Qvantel focuses on providing customized, cloud based, criti-
cal business support solutions (BSS) to ICT service providers, e-Invoicing consolida-
tors, utilities and media companies. The company is located in Finland, Sweden, Es-
tonia and India with most of the over 250 people located in Jyväskylä, Finland. 
(Qvantel, 2015) 
Qvantel Corporation constructs from several companies. Qvantel Finland Oy, Qvantel 
India, Qvantel AB, Qvantel Estonia OÜ and Onesto Services Oy. Qvantel India is lo-
cated in Hyderabad and focuses on development projects that cover the Internet of 
things for Qvantel customers. Qvantel acquired Onesto Services in the early 2014 to 
enable Qvantel to provide a wider solution portfolio to telecom operators. Onesto 
Services focuses on designing service concepts and BSS solutions e.g. customer ser-
vice, prepaid integration, credit scoring, and sales force management tools. (Qvantel, 
2015) Qvantel Sweden Ab is located in Karlskrona and mainly focuses on developing 
the web application modules of the Qvantel BSS solutions. (Qvantel, 2015) 
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Qvantel Finland Oy is the largest unit of Qvantel Corporation and has over 150 em-
ployees with most of them located in Jyväskylä. The company provides end-to-end 
support solutions on business process for billing and enterprise resource manage-
ment combining online store sales and product catalog solutions to telecom opera-
tors’ back-end systems. (Qvantel, 2015) 
1.2 Scope of Thesis 
The thesis focuses on the implementation of the Centrify Suite solution to enhance 
the capabilities of Active Directory (AD) in an environment that contains Windows, 
Linux and Solaris servers. AD implementation and configuration was not included in 
the thesis as a whole; however, there are parts that were critical to the configuration 
of Centrify and therefore they were included. In addition, initial testing and evalua-
tion of Centrify Suite 2012 is no included in this thesis regardless of the importance 
of proper product evaluation and testing. This thesis does not cover workstation en-
vironment deployment although it was a part of the centralized authentication pro-
ject. 
1.3 Background 
Due to the growth of the amount of systems and personnel that need to be managed 
by the administrative team the pressure for resourcing has grown linearly. In addi-
tion, end users have faced a situation where they have a huge amount of usernames 
and passwords to remember. A recent survey by Finn Partners and Centrify (Finn 
Partners, 2014) shows that an average 100-person company loses over 35 000€ per 
year in productivity because of password management alone; not to mention the se-
curity risks that are faced when users circulate the same password in many systems 
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because it cannot be denied, managed or monitored by anyone with reasonable ef-
fort.  
Qvantel has chosen the Centrify Suite to help securely leverage AD infrastructure to 
manage centrally authentication, access control, privilege management, policy en-
forcement and compliance across server platforms (virtual and physical). The solu-
tion was deployed to Linux and Solaris servers in the Qvantel production platform 
and to the heterogeneous workstation environment, which included Windows, Mac-
intosh OS X and Linux workstations.  
1.4 Research method 
Choosing research methods proved to be somewhat challenging in this case since the 
thesis describes an implementation of a technology to an information system, and 
the desired end result for the thesis was to cover the actual technical aspect of the 
change in the environment. A further aspect of research could have been the selec-
tion of the technology or study the impact of the implementation on the business 
processes. Those areas would have presented more options in choosing actual re-
search methods because in that case qualitative and quantitative methods could 
have been used to study the results in more depth.  
Case study was a logical choice as the main research method; however, as Lukka 
states in his article (Lukka, 2001), case study method can contain several sub meth-
ods such as constructive method, which is used to research real-life problems that 
need to be solved. Currently the constructive research method is commonly used in 
information systems science (Lukka, 2001). Unlike conventional research methods, 
constructive research seeks to strongly influence the subject and the ideal result of 
the research would be to solve a real-life problem with new construction implemen-
tation that offers practical and theoretical contribution. 
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Quantitative methods were used to some extent to interpret the facts and initial the-
ory that the author had regarding the impact of the final implementation. Since 
quantitative methods involve measuring and statistical analysis (Gillham, 2000, p. 9) 
they were used to analyze how the implementation affected the Identity and access 
management (IAM) in teams that had the most workload in processing the access re-
quests. As stated in the previous chapter, the workload was growing rapidly regard-
ing IAM, which had an effect on resolution times used as evidence in the quantitative 
analysis. The evidence was gathered from the company service request management 
system where all IAM issues were documented.  
1.5 Research objectives 
The objectives for the research were to establish a technological capability for scala-
ble IAM in the organization’s production platform that would enhance administration 
work, information security and provide evidence in form of audit logging. In addition, 
the thesis strives to study what level of impact a managed IAM caused to operating 
expense (OPEX). How could the initial capital expenditure (CAPEX) be redeemed in 
operational cost savings? Moreover, what would have been the situation without the 
initial investment?  
2 SECURITY 
2.1 Information security 
The objective for information security in businesses in general is to protect the or-
ganization’s information by reducing the risk in losing the integrity, confidentiality 
and availability of information assets to an acceptable level. 
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Confidentiality  
The term confidentiality means guarding the information from everyone except 
those with rights to it. The information includes private data of customers, and intel-
lectual property of businesses or customer information. In everyday life, private data 
is handled and passed on to other parties to store. These transactions are so com-
mon that people do not even understand the vast amount of information that is 
trusted to another party. To establish a trust to a service it is highly important to 
keep this data confidential. (Solomon & Kim, 2012, p. 12) 
Integrity 
Information must not change uncontrollably and its validity and accuracy must be 
maintained. If the integrity of information is compromised, then the information has 
no use since it cannot be trusted. Integrity deals with validity and accuracy of data 
(Solomon & Kim, 2012, p. 12). 
Availability 
In information security, availability is a common term used to express the amount of 
time users can access a system, application or data. The common measurements 
used to calculate the availability are  : (Solomon & Kim, 2012, p. 11) 
 Downtime 
 Uptime 
 Availability = (Total Uptime) / (Total Uptime – Total Downtime) 
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2.2 Identity and access management 
What is identity? That can be defined in information technology as a set of user at-
tributes or properties that distinguish entities in the environment from one another 
(Bertino & Takahashi, 2011). Users in this context are not just people but also com-
puting software agent or a hardware device. IAM is a set of technologies and busi-
ness processes to enable individuals to access the needed resources when they need 
and have permission to access them for a specified reason. IAM usually enhances the 
organization’s capability to manage changes to access rights and other features in a 
more secure way. 
2.3 Privileged access management 
User account compromise is the most probable way for a malicious entity to access 
organization’s infrastructure based on the 2015 Data Breach Investigations Report 
(DBIR) by Verizon as seen in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Significant threat actions over time by percent. (Verizon Enterprise 
Solutions, 2015) 
According to Micki & Tipton (2012) “Effective privileged user controls need to com-
bine policies, procedures, and technologies that address the particular environment 
and needs of organizations.”. The way organizations adapt this varies and one could 
state that identical solutions are not found between different organizations because 
they always need to match the specific requirements of the company. Every organi-
zation that wants to secure access management, prevent or detect incidents or react 
quickly when user access is compromised, needs to have appropriate privileged user 
controls in place. (Micki & Tipton, 2012) 
2.4 Authentication 
Authentication as a process is about verifying the truth of a claim (National Research 
Council, 2003, p. 33). It is about making sure that users are who they claim to be. It is 
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also about ensuring that authorized end users initiate all processes and transactions. 
The authentication process pairs the login information such as user id or a user ac-
count with a password to form an identifier for the user. The identifier is used to as-
sign privileges and to track all activity for auditing purposes. Identification is the 
means by which a user provides a claimed identity to the system. Authentication is 
the means of establishing the validity of this claim. (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, 1997, p. 181) 
2.5 Critical security controls 
In 2008, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) began an effort to approach the 
threats of cyber security with a list of controls that would have the greatest impact 
on improving the security against real-world threats. The venture quickly grew out-
side of U.S. government domain when international agencies and privately held com-
panies joined the effort. As a result, a list of recommendations as critical security 
controls was published through SANS Institute. Currently, the list of controls is 
planned and managed by a global independent entity called the Council on Cyberse-
curity. Below is the list of Critical Security Controls as follows:  (SANS Institute, 2014)  
Critical Security Controls version 5 
1. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices 
2. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software 
3. Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices, Lap-
tops, Workstations, and Servers 
4. Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation 
5. Malware Defenses 
6. Application Software Security 
7. Wireless Access Control 
8. Data Recovery Capability 
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9. Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps 
10. Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and 
Switches 
11. Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services 
12. Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges 
13. Boundary Defense 
14. Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs 
15. Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know 
16. Account Monitoring and Control 
17. Data Protection 
18. Incident Response and Management 
19. Secure Network Engineering 
20. Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises 
The centralized authentication solution can provide controls against several critical 
threats in the cybersecurity domain. AD with Centrify can be configured to provide 
capabilities beyond just authentication. The use of Group Policies has been a way to 
provide configuration management in Windows environments and with Centrify at-
tached to AD that is possible in UNIX as well. 
When implementing the centralized authentication with the right tools, several con-
trols can be implemented completely or partially and thus decrease the risks in infor-
mation security. The controls achieved with the right implementation are: 
 Partial inventory of Authorized Devices 
 Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices, Lap-
tops, Workstations, and Servers 
 Partially controlling Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation with patch 
management  
 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges 
 Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know 
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 Account Monitoring and Control 
2.6 Segregation of Duties 
The principle of segregation of duties separates an operation into function so that no 
single person can control the whole process from initial actions to finish. Actions 
would require multiple persons on multiple roles to complete a specific operation. 
One person creates code, the second person reviews it and another person deploys it 
to the system. Segregation of duties is especially critical, for example when handling 
financial transactions.  
3 OVERVIEW OF LINUX AUTHENTICATION 
3.1 Conventional authentication 
Linux was not originally built with a single authentication solution in mind 
(Kirkpatrick, 2008) and as a result, Linux application developers generally imple-
mented their own authentication solutions to their applications. The authentication 
solutions could use the operating system credentials since in almost all Linux distri-
butions user information is stored in /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow which are text 
files that contain account information like username, User ID (UID), Group ID (GID), 
full name, home directory and shell type (Schneider, 2003). The /etc/shadow con-
tains the actual passwords in encrypted format and additional properties related to 
the password. (Schneider, 2003) 
A sample /etc/passwd entry 
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roger:x:503:50:Roger Foster:/home/roger:/bin/bash 
An example of the users /etc/shadow entry 
roger:$1$wKAP1RyH$JeCAcEGhSGVlD0J7.AMg.0:14396:2:5:7:30:: 
In 1995 Sun Microsystems proposed a mechanism called Pluggable Authentication 
Modules (PAM) which provided a common set of APIs for authentication that appli-
cation developers could use. The document defining PAM is a request-for-comments 
paper (RFC) that was written by Vipin Samar and Roland J. Schemers III of SunSoft, 
Inc. Specifically, it is OSF-RFC 86.0, October 1995, “Unified Login with Pluggable Au-
thentication Modules (PAM)” (Morgan, 1997). Originally, PAM was developed for So-
laris but later on 1996 it was ported to Linux systems as Linux-PAM. (Geisshirt, 2007) 
PAM modules are classified into module types that should implement at least one of 
the four module type functions (Geisshirt, 2007): 
1. The authentication module is used to authenticate users or set/destroy cre-
dentials. 
2. The account management modules perform actions related to access, ac-
count and credential expiration, password restrictions/rules, etc. 
3. The session management module is used for initializing and terminating ses-
sions. 
4. The password management module performs actions related to password 
change/updates. (Srivistava, 2009) 
The illustration of PAM architecture is shown in Figure 2. 
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PAM-aware 
application
PAM library
Config
/etc/pam.d
auth account session password
 
Figure 2. PAM architecture and relation of parts. (Geisshirt, 2007) 
 
PAM provides functional capabilities to implement authentication, such as access 
control, session management, and more. (Geisshirt, 2007): 
Nowadays most Linux distributions have multiple PAM authentication modules that 
provide support for a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) directory and 
ability to use Kerberos for authentication (Kirkpatrick, 2008).  
3.2 Authenticating with SSH 
SSH is used to secure connections and encrypt communication between user and 
server. The authentication process is handled with public-key encryption and trans-
missions are encrypted by a cipher agreed by the client and the server for a particu-
lar session. Upon connection SSH authenticates a host by verifying that the host is 
valid and can be communicated with. After establishing that the user is authenti-
cated to verify the user is who he claims to be. (Petersen, 2008) 
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3.3 Kerberos authentication 
Kerberos is a network authentication protocol that provides encrypted client and 
server communications. The service involves two modules, an authentication server 
(AS) and a ticket-granting server (TGS). When combined they form a Key Distribution 
Center (KDC). User is validated based on information stored in the user database 
(Petersen, 2008). Kerberos is used every time a user logs to an AD-joined computer 
and when a user accesses a network resource like a file share. AD DC functions as the 
KDC server handling the tickets between clients and users. (Walla, 2000) In Centrify 
enabled network Kerberos authentication is a vital part of user authentication to 
servers. Figure 3 illustrates the Kerberos authentication process where client is ac-
cessing a server using Kerberos authentication.  
Client
Service
Kerberos server (AS, TGS)
1. Auth request for TGS access
2. TGT given to client
3. User requests and 
is granted ticket to 
access a service
4. Access a service 
using TGS ticket
 
Figure 3. Kerberos authentication. 
Kerberos authentication process when authenticating to a server: (Walla, 2000) 
1. Authentication request for TGS access 
2. TGT given to client 
3. User requests and is granted ticket to access a service 
20 
 
 
4. Access a service using TGS ticket 
3.4 Traditional integration between Linux and Windows 
Several Linux distributions contain some level of readiness for AD integration, which 
can be used for file sharing and login access. There are few possible paths to inte-
grate a Linux system to AD and usually they involve solutions like Winbind, LDAP/Ker-
beros or System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) to establish the connectivity 
(Cowley, 2013). Not all of the solutions listed provide services like file sharing; how-
ever, file sharing can be enabled using Samba to provide Windows networking capa-
bility.  
As seen in Figure 4, PAM communicates with SSSD or Winbind, which uses LDAP and 
Kerberos to talk to AD. LDAP is used to perform identification and Kerberos handles 
authentication. Regardless of the solutions used to integrate the platforms, some 
prerequisites need to be fulfilled (Cowley, 2013). 
 Fully working Domain Name Service (DNS) with forward and reverse lookups. 
Kerberos authentication will fail if DNS is not operating correctly. 
 Time must be in sync on all nodes included in the integration. Kerberos can 
withstand a small (approximately five minutes) difference in system times 
otherwise, it will fail. 
 Identity Management for UNIX feature must be installed in the AD so that 
*NIX system data like GID, UID and home directory information can be sub-
mitted. 
 LDAP searches must be enabled from the Linux clients either using anony-
mous bind or authenticated. Anonymous bind is not recommended in any sit-
uation. 
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Figure 4. Authenticating to Active Directory on Linux. (Cowley, 2013). 
 
While the native integration of a Linux system to AD seems straight forward and well 
documented procedure it still requires large amounts of manual configuration work 
or great effort in producing a deployment system that automates the steps of the in-
tegration and that would not be cost efficient when scaling the amount of systems 
and complexity.  
3.5 Privilege Escalation in Linux 
In Linux, there are two ways to execute applications as administrative (root) user. 
User can switch to root user using the su command, or by using the sudo. Sudo com-
mand comes from words “substitute use do” or “super user do”. What sudo does is 
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that it enables user to switch to a different user to execute a command, whether it is 
root or some other user. Configuring sudo command is done via command visudo, 
which opens the /etc/sudoers file for editing. Disadvantages for using sudo is that the 
configuration file is a local file and for effective rights management the configuration 
needs to be distributed to servers in some way.  
4 MICROSOFT ACTIVE DIRECTORY SERVICES 
4.1 Benefits of Active Directory  
Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) is a multi-master LDAP compliant database 
that is used to create a scalable, secure, and manageable infrastructure for user and 
resource management, and to provide support for directory-enabled applications. 
(Microsoft, 2013) 
In business environments AD services have become the most used solutions in 
providing services needed to manage information resources such as users, groups 
and computers. AD DS provides excellent tools for businesses to manage their assets 
by organizing them into a hierarchical structure and proving an integrated security 
features for authentication and access control of the resources in the environment. 
By adding other AD roles such as Federation and Certificate services a company can 
add the value gained from the Domain Services by using it as a central authentication 
directory for external services and a distribution system for PKI solution.  
AD DS is designed for scalability in mind where the AD forest acts as a security 
boundary for an organization and scope of administration privileges are defined 
within the AD forest. In a single domain environment, a forest contains only one do-
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main, however an additional domain can be created to the forest to provide parti-
tioning of the information stored in the AD. Separation of domains in the forest could 
extend the administrative control over different stakeholders for security reasons. 
For example, in an environment where an office’s information assets and administra-
tion need to be completely separated from the production server administration.  
One of the powerful tools in AD DS are Group Policies that ease the management of 
complex environments. Policies define setting for the various components of the sys-
tems administrators need to manage like: 
 Security settings 
 Fine grained password setting 
 Assign scripts 
 Manage settings based on templates 
Policies can be targeted based on many different methods or a combination of them, 
which gives administrator flexibility in defining the practices how to implement the 
designed policies to environments. 
4.2 How information is stored in Active Directory 
Network objects are stored into a secure hierarchical containment structure that is 
known as the logical structure. (Microsoft, 2014) Forests, domains and organizational 
units (OUs) are the core elements of the AD logical structure. The elements are de-
scribed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Domain and Forest Components. (Microsoft, 2014) 
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Component Description 
Forest A forest is the highest level of the logical structure hierarchy. An 
AD forest represents a single self-contained directory. A forest is 
a security boundary, which means that administrators in a forest 
have complete control over all access to information that is 
stored inside the forest and to the DCs that are used to imple-
ment the forest. 
Domain Domains partition the information that is stored inside the direc-
tory into smaller portions so that the information can be more 
easily stored on various DCs and so that administrators have a 
greater degree of control over replication. Data that is stored in 
the directory is replicated throughout the forest from one DC to 
another. Some data that is relevant to the entire forest is repli-
cated to all DCs. Other data that is relevant only to a specific do-
main is replicated only to DCs in that particular domain. A good 
domain design makes it possible to implement an efficient repli-
cation topology. This is important because it enables administra-
tors to manage the flow of data across the network, that is, to 
control how much data is replicated and where that replication 
traffic takes place. 
OU OUs provide a means for administrators to group resources, such 
as user accounts or computer accounts, so that the resources can 
be managed as one unit. This makes it much easier to apply 
Group Policy to multiple computers or to control the access of 
many users to a single resource. OUs also make it easier to dele-
gate control over resources to various administrators. 
 
In addition to forests, domains and OUs AD logical structure contains containers that 
resemble OUs in many ways. The domain has seven built-in objects with object type 
as container. They come pre-installed when the first DC is promoted to network.  
Figure 5 shows the structure of the AD and the relations between forest, domain, OU 
and DC.  
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Figure 5. Active Directory Data Structure. (Microsoft, 2014) 
4.3 DNS and Active Directory Sites 
Centrify agent determines its connection status based on the availability of DNS and 
AD. If the initial DNS request for a host name is successful, the Centrify agent at-
tempts to connect to the appropriate DC and Global Catalog for its joined domain us-
ing the site information found in DNS. Site information is configured using AD native 
tool Active Directory Sites and Services. All subnets that contain servers joined to 
Centrify managed hierarchy need to be defined in an AD Site. Using the site infor-
mation, the agent queries DNS for a list of the DCs in its site and attempts to connect 
to the nearest DC.  
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4.4 Read-only domain controller 
Microsoft introduced Read-only domain controller (RODC) with the Windows Server 
2008 release. The new server role is intended to be used in situations where physical 
security could not be guaranteed.  RODC can host read-only copies of the partitions 
of the AD database and read-only copy of the SYSVOL folder contents. With RODC, 
administrators can selectively cache credentials to provide fast authentication and 
domain services in locations that lack the security of a datacenter such as branch of-
fices and perimeter networks. (Microsoft, 2012) 
In addition to enhancements to security, RODC can simplify the replication topology 
of and environment. Replacing writable DCs in remote locations reduces the load on 
actual DCs in datacenters that are replication partners to a large number of other 
DCs in remote locations. In addition, the use of RODC reduces the number of replica-
tion connections in the topology.  (Microsoft, 2012) 
4.5 Perimeter network 
Perimeter network, which is referred commonly as demilitarized zone (DMZ) in the 
firewall business. DMZ is a closely monitored network from where services can be ex-
posed to public without creating unnecessary risk to organizations internal network. 
Figure 6 illustrates the traffic flow between DMZ and internal network. Fundamental 
philosophy of DMZ is to provide multiple layers of security to protect critical assets 
better. If a hacker breaches the firewall and access to DMZ is gained, lateral move-
ment would not provide significant results. Without the DMZ, the first penetration 
would expose the internal network and result in serious compromise. Services placed 
in the DMZ should never be trusted fully because the risk of compromise is higher 
than in the internal network. (Cheswick, Bellovin, & Rubin, 2003) 
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Figure 6. Traffic flow from Internet to perimeter network and from perimeter to in-
ternal network. 
5 CENTRIFY 
5.1 Company 
Centrify was founded in 2004 and is based in Sunnyvale, California. The company fo-
cuses on IAM market. The company is competing with Server Suite against CA Tech-
nologies Access Control, Quest Software, and Beyond Trust on their main business 
area; however, they are also a major player in the submarket privileged identity man-
agement. (Hudson, 2012) 
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Centrify has acquired major players from IT business as partners e.g. Apple, Mi-
crosoft, SAP and HP and from over 5,000 customers globally Centrify lists organiza-
tions from several agencies of the U.S. government to global players like Sony, Veri-
zon, Boeing and Toyota. According to them, they are supplying 24 of the Fortune 50 
companies.  (Centify Corporation, 2015) 
5.2 Centrify software suite 
Centrify Suite provides an integration layer between Windows and other operating 
environments. Centrify Suite 2012 enabled secure authentication, authorization, di-
rectory service, and configuration management through Microsoft AD (Centrify 
Corporation, 2012, p. 8). The software establishes the use of features of AD such as 
group policies, security groups and user management in various environments like: 
 UNIX, Linux, and Mac OS X operating environments 
 Web and J2EE application platforms, such as Apache, Tomcat, JBoss, Web-
Logic, and WebSphere 
 Database platforms such as DB2, Oracle, and SAP 
When a managed system joins an AD domain, it essentially becomes an AD client and 
relies on AD to provide authentication, authorization, policy management, and direc-
tory services. The interaction between the client agent (adclient) on the local com-
puter and AD is similar to the interaction between a Windows client and its AD DC.  
In the implementation, Centrify is used to manage Linux and Solaris servers and Mac 
OS X workstations that are joined to AD domain. Centrify provides tools to enable 
centralized authentication, password management and rights delegation to opera-
tional users (external and internal). 
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5.3 Centrify Components 
The Centrify software suite consists of several components that together provide an 
integration layer between Microsoft Windows-based AD environment and infor-
mation systems running on variety of other operating systems or application environ-
ments.  
Components are split to two main categories that include applications running on 
Windows machines that provide the functionality to manage AD-based objects and 
agents that run on systems that are integrated to AD. 
5.3.1 DirectManage Deployment Manager 
With Deployment Manager, administrators can manage the Centrify software inven-
tory, remotely access information about remote systems and use the tool to deploy 
client software. In addition, the tool can be used to perform basic evaluation of secu-
rity risks and vulnerabilities. Deployment Manager is especially valuable when de-
ployments are done to environments that have vast amount of unmanaged servers 
and updating the clients on the managed systems. Figure 7 illustrates the user inter-
face (UI) of the Deployment Manager. 
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Figure 7. Deployment manager. 
5.3.2 Zone Provisioning Agent 
The Zone Provisioning Agent (ZPA) enables automated provisioning of user and group 
accounts to Centrify zones. ZPA monitors zone specific AD groups, which contain user 
accounts, or groups needed in the specific zone. ZPA adds or removes members from 
designated zones based on changes made to the defined AD groups. The business 
rules that control provisioning are stored in AD. 
The application runs as a separate service on a Windows server on an ongoing basis 
and should be always available. ZPA can be installed on two computers but only one 
instance should be running at a time. The second instance can be used for standby 
operations like maintenance or the primary node. At least one ZPA should be in-
stalled to each forest if multiple forests exist in the environment.  
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Following components are included in the installation: 
 Zone Property Page Extension is installed on the same computer as Access 
Manager, which enables a tab in zone properties for making provisioning con-
figurations. 
 Provisioning Agent Windows service is the main application handling the 
provisioning of assets and should be always available. 
 Command Line Interface (CLI) allows administrators to write scripts for provi-
sioning tasks on demand. 
 
5.3.3 DirectControl Administration Console 
The DirectControl Administrator Console is a Microsoft Management Console (MMC) 
snap-in. It is the primary console for managing Centrify DirectControl properties be-
cause it provides access to a full spectrum of management activities specific to Di-
rectControl. DirectControl Administration Console must be installed at least on one 
computer that can access the domains in AD.  
The use of administrative console is illustrated in Figure 8: 
1. Administrator manages the system using console access 
2. Administrative Console is installed on one server and integrated to AD do-
main. Administrators can manage the operation and deployment of Centrify 
from the server. 
3. AD domain, which contains all servers, users, groups and computers. 
4. Member systems running variety of operating systems such as Solaris, Linux 
and Mac OS X. 
5. DirectControl Agent (adclient) used to integrate and manage the client sys-
tems. 
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Figure 8. Simplified view of AD integration. 
 
5.3.4 DirectControl Agent 
The Agent enables UNIX, Linux or Mac OS X systems to communicate with AD like a 
Windows system. The client agent performs several tasks on the managed system re-
lated to communication and authentication and enables the implementation of 
Group Policies on the non-Windows client systems.  
Agent installation consists of several different modules that manage different aspects 
of the integration (Figure 9). During the agent installation, several commands like 
programs are also installed that can be used to manage the systems. 
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Figure 9. Centrify UNIX agent overview.  
 
Adclient process is the core that handles all direct communication with Active 
Director. The agent contacts AD when there are requests for authentication, 
authorization, directory assistance or policy updates. Then the credentials or other 
information are passed to the program that need this information. (Centrify 
Corporation, 2012, p. 26) 
6  MANAGING SYSTEMS WITH CENTRIFY 
6.1 Zones 
Centrify allows two fundamentally different solutions in creating Zones. Classic Zones 
were introduced before Hierarchical Zones and they represent a common bundle of 
systems, users and groups that were identified from company environment. In order 
to account for multiple bundles, multiple zones needed to be created as illustrated in 
Figure 10. 
34 
 
 
Marketing
Developers
Management
 
Figure 10. Classic Zones from bundles. 
With creative use of PAM overrides and Group Policies, some of the Zones could be 
combined; however, this can be rather complex and difficult to audit. The fundamen-
tal reason why classic Zones are not used is that inheritance of roles and rights is pre-
vented. It is not possible to define a group of users who could perform privileged 
commands or log in to multiple Zones. Instead, using classic Zones, each UNIX user 
needs to be added to each Zone, and then roles and rights in each Zone are config-
ured, and after that, the roles to users are assigned in all Zones. 
Zone is an administrative point and with hierarchical zones, inheritance allows ad-
ministrators to define UNIX attributes for users and groups in a parent zone and then 
have that attribute remain identical in all subsequent child zones. However, use of 
hierarchical zones allows override of inheritance at a granular level. In Figure 11 us-
ers “john” and “roger” locate in the parent zone and are usable in the child zone due 
to inheritance; however, in this example user “john” has UNIX attributes that are 
overridden in the child zone. 
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Parent Zone
roger:x:503:50:Roger Foster:/home/roger:/bin/bash
Child Zone
roger:x:503:50:Roger Foster:/home/roger:/bin/bash
john:x:503:50:John Doe:/home/john:/bin/bash
john:x:1000:500:John Doe:/export/john:/bin/bash
 
Figure 11. Hierarchical Zones allow inheritance. 
There is plenty of functionality in using the overrides since they can be used in multi-
ple levels through the hierarchy. For example, user could have a specific UID in every 
server in every zone except one where it is overridden at server level.  
6.2 Access management using hierarchical zones 
The built-in authorization facility (DirectAuthorize) centrally manages and enforces 
role-based entitlements for fine-grained control of user access and privileges on 
UNIX and Linux systems. By controlling how users access systems and what they can 
do on those computers, DirectAuthorize enables administrators to lock down sensi-
tive systems and eliminate uncontrolled use of root accounts and passwords. 
Centrify has four different levels of access when using the hierarchical zone structure 
as seen in Figure 12. As a best practice, the first zone that is created should be a 
Global zone and all other zones will be child zones for that. Defining access rights to 
Global zone is considered as universal access and that will grant access to all UNIX 
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hosts regardless of which zone they are joined to. The next level of access is zone ac-
cess that will grant user access to all UNIX hosts in the current zone. The third access 
level is computer override access where an individual or group is granted specific ac-
cess to a single host. The final level of access is computer role access that gives gran-
ular levels of access to a computer or a group of computers.  
Universal access
Zone access
Computer Override
Computer Role Access
 
Figure 12. Types of access. 
6.3 Computer authorization roles  
One of the great benefits of computer roles is that the access can be controlled 
simply by grouping systems together. Computer groups are normal security groups in 
AD that preferably reside in a specific OU(s) and follow a defined naming scheme so 
they are easy to recognize as computer groups used for Centrify computer roles. The 
groups can be pre-created to AD or they can be created during the creation of com-
puter role. It is recommended that if there are several groups that need to be cre-
ated they are pre-populated using PowerShell or other scripting tool. 
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Creating computer authorization roles always when new system groups are added to 
the environment is recommended since the creation is a one-time operation and 
managing access to the group of systems can be done from AD after that by adding 
users to access roles or by expanding the system group with new servers. Figure 13 
illustrates the creation of a computer role to Centrify DirectManage Access Manager. 
 
Figure 13. Creating computer group. 
6.4 Direct Authorize Do (dzdo) 
UNIX commands that require elevated permissions can be defined in the /etc/sudo-
ers configuration file run by using the visudo command. DirectControl provides simi-
lar functionality, however, the commands that are configured through command 
rights, are executed with the dzdo command and use the DirectControl authorization 
store rather than a /etc/sudoers configuration file.  
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If a user is assigned a role that includes privileged command rights, the user can run 
those privileged commands by invoking the dzdo command, any command line op-
tions, and the privileged command name. The dzdo command provides functionality 
similar to the UNIX sudo command to enable a user to execute a command using an-
other user account. A user assigned to a role that includes this right can then execute 
the command as root by typing a command similar to the following: 
$ dzdo service crond start 
 
Another example for common dzdo use would be the change to another user within 
the UNIX system.  
$ dzdo –s 
 
The dzdo command with the option -s commands to open an elevated shell as is 
stated in the man page of the dzdo command. 
-s Runs the shell specified by the SHELL 
environment variable if it is set or 
the shell as specified in the user’s 
UNIX profile. 
 
To change to another user with an interactive shell following command is used: 
$ dzdo –iu roger 
 
6.5 Authorization role definitions 
The golden rule with authorization roles is – No role means no access. Authorization 
roles could be considered as toolboxes that contain all the tools user needs to get 
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the job done. This means that the authorization role contains access rights and com-
mand execution rights for that role that is given to a group of users.  
Role definitions are located in every zone within the logical structure. They are inher-
ited to child zones and can be used in any zone they have been inherited.  
Figure 14 shows an example of an authorization role, the privileged commands and 
PAM accesses granted. 
 
Figure 14. Authorization role definitions. 
The authorization roles are assigned in an object from DirectControl and they are 
connected with a group from AD that contains the desired set of users. The connec-
tion can be done in all four levels of access mentioned in chapter 6.2. Basic rights del-
egation is emphasized in Figure 15 where a group of users located in AD is granted an 
authorization role and authorization targeted to a groups of computers (computer 
authorization role). As a result, the users can access all of the servers in the com-
puter groups and have the set of privileges in use that were granted via the authori-
zation role.  
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Figure 15. Authorization of access and commands. 
6.5.1 DirectControl for PAM services 
In Linux and UNIX environments, many services are programmed to use PAM to con-
trol access. Centrify supplies default PAM rights for Secure Shell (SSH); however, ad-
ministrators can add additional rights to other programs depending on the environ-
ment and need. In addition to default services, common programs that can be man-
aged through DirectControl are Telnet, FTP, and graphical desktop. Use of wildcards 
is possible to perform pattern matching for the application name, for example, to 
match all PAM-enabled applications containing the string ftp string *ftp*. Table 2 de-
scribes the predefined PAM access rights that are populated to every zone created to 
the hierarchical zone structure.  
Table 2. Predefined PAM access rights. 
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PAM right Access granted 
login-all All PAM applications on a computer joined to the domain.  
This PAM access right allows users to log on and use any PAM-en-
abled application. This right uses the wild card (*) character to 
match all PAM application names and is included by default in the 
predefined UNIX Login role. You can add this right to any role for 
which you want global PAM access. 
ssh SSH sessions on Debian and Ubuntu 6 and 7.  
This PAM access right allows users to log on remotely using SSH 
connections on Debian and Ubuntu computers joined to the do-
main. 
sshd SSH sessions on all Linux and UNIX computers except Debian and 
Ubuntu 6 and 7. 
 This PAM access right allows users to log on remotely using SSH 
connections on all other distributions of Linux and UNIX comput-
ers joined to the domain. 
 
6.5.2 User attributes in Active Directory 
Centrify stores user attributes in AD structure at a location specified in the initial in-
stallation. All users that are provisioned to Centrify have a set of attributes that form 
a part their identity in the network including: 
 Login name 
 UID 
 Primary Group (GID) 
 GECOS which is defined as user full name 
 Default home directory 
 Default shell 
42 
 
 
If the information is changed in AD, it will be visible on all member servers. However, 
if any of the attributes is changed on a server level using the overrides, the changes 
are not reflected to AD attributes visible in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. User attributes in Active Directory. 
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7 OVERVIEW OF THE ORIGINAL ENVIRONMENT 
7.1 Environment description 
The company provides BSS from a private cloud platform infrastructure that con-
structs mainly of Linux servers and few instances of Solaris. Total number of servers 
exceeding over 300 virtual and physical included. In addition to production servers, 
there are many servers providing support functions like monitoring, backup, net-
working and file services just to mention few.  
The user base can be divided to three main groups. Developers, administrators and 
support staff. Most of the user accounts reside in the first two groups. Account man-
agement practices varied between different sub environments, which made the ad-
ministrative teams work quite challenging, and time consuming. 
7.2 User and access management 
With Linux and UNIX systems, there are ways to implement authentication solutions 
that are centrally managed like LDAP or Network Information Service (NIS). If UNIX 
server is not attached to any external authentication source, it uses local configura-
tion file to handle password authentication. Only a small portion of servers was part 
of LDAP authentication service and most of them were servers that provided support 
for company’s internal functions.  
Privileged access rights for users were managed using sudo and the configuration 
was managed locally on each server. Service requests that involved some form of ac-
cess or user management were very time consuming.  
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7.3 Configuration management 
All configurations on the servers were managed manually including privilege escala-
tion and user management. A set of pre-written configurations was deployed during 
installation to maintain a managed server environment. The servers were kept in 
good condition despite that there were no configuration management applications 
like puppet or chef in use, which was partly due to strict automated monitoring con-
figured to alert if any of the predefined conditions was exceeded. In addition, the ad-
ministrative team was small and were well aware of the status in the environment.  
Although the initial installations were quite well managed, the change management 
to existing installations brought challenges. There were no centralized means to de-
ploy configuration changes, which left room for human errors. The changes in config-
uration could not be tracked automatically and up-to-date documentation relied on 
individual effort by the individual making the change.  
7.4 Cost of administrative effort for IAM 
Managing user accounts and access rights in an environment that did not have a cen-
tralized management point was very time consuming if the tasks included several us-
ers or servers needing rights delegation. Simple tasks were handled in quite short 
time that varied from 10 minutes to 1 hour. If the amount of changes grew, the 
amount of administrative effort grew linearly in relation. This was verified by investi-
gating issues in the company’s issue tracking system and the times used to resolve 
issues relating to access management.  
The plan was to study all issues related to access management in the issue tracking 
system. However, there were difficulties to filter issues that were interesting to this 
study and the work was more or less manual. A set of issues was filtered manually 
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that only introduced access management relating tasks before the centralized au-
thentication was deployed and this can be seen in Table 3. The set included simple 
issues that were resolved with a minimal effort and issues that were time consuming 
without proper authentication solution. Almost all of the tasks in Table 3 would have 
been resolved in less than 30 minutes using IAM solution. 
Table 3. Access management issues. 
Issue Created Time Spent 
3182 04.01.2013 10:06 1 h, 0 min 
3263 30.01.2013 14:27 0 h, 30 min 
3306 18.02.2013 10:31 8 h, 15 min 
3311 19.02.2013 09:41 1 h, 0 min 
3313 19.02.2013 10:47 0 h, 5 min 
3318 19.02.2013 15:59 0 h, 20 min 
3334 24.02.2013 21:36 1 h, 45 min 
3335 26.02.2013 10:24 4 h, 0 min 
3344 27.02.2013 16:21 2 h, 5 min 
3419 02.04.2013 13:28 1 h, 0 min 
3481 19.04.2013 14:37 0 h, 20 min 
3536 17.05.2013 14:41 5 h, 30 min 
3574 27.05.2013 09:51 5 h, 20 min 
3575 27.05.2013 13:10 0 h, 10 min 
3591 30.05.2013 09:22 0 h, 15 min 
3597 30.05.2013 16:09 6 h, 45 min 
3646 12.06.2013 13:14 0 h, 30 min 
3647 12.06.2013 17:25 2 h, 0 min 
3672 24.06.2013 15:30 0 h, 15 min 
3707 08.07.2013 16:23 8 h, 0 min 
3733 30.07.2013 10:09 0 h, 30 min 
AVERAGE 
 
1 h, 30 min 
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The average time spent to a simple access change in the original environment was 
approximately 30 minutes, and complicated access rights took an average of 6 hours 
and 20 minutes. The average time spent on all access management issues before the 
authentication overhaul was 1.5 hours. The administrative team specialists that nor-
mally are the most expensive resources did all work regarding access management, 
which was due to the composition of the system so rights management could not be 
separated to cheaper resources like Service Desk.  
The goal was to greatly reduce the time spent on access management issues so that 
access rights already configured to the system should be taken care of with a 5 to 15- 
minute effort as well as moving the access management work away from the system 
management team to another group or team. The change was planned to free re-
sources in the infrastructure specialist team and to distribute the IAM workload to 
respected stakeholders. 
8 CREATING THE PLAN  
8.1 Planning as a process 
The planning work started based on the information gathered while working in the 
environment and conducting discussions with the administrators. The planning fo-
cused on the idea of centralizing all authentications with a scalable solution while 
maintaining easy management of rights. Centrify was already selected to be used in 
with AD during the initial AD implementation and that helped somewhat in the plan-
ning process. Since Centrify Suite is a critical part of the IT infrastructure, the testing 
was carried out before starting the planning of the actual production deployment. 
However, that is not addressed in the thesis due to the scope of the thesis. (Centrify 
Corporation, 2012) 
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The requirements of the solution were listed to provide a base for the design: 
 Single user account for operative environments 
 Enforced password policy 
 Automatic lockdown 
 Easy management 
 Minimizing administrative effort 
 Auditing the usage of servers 
 Uniforming the environment 
 Automating tasks 
The project was split to seven phases, which were called as Deployment life cycle by 
Centrify Deployment & Planning guide (Centrify Corporation, 2012, pp. 15-16). The 
project phases followed the standard Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
(ITIL) Plan Do Check Act (PDCA) model seen in Figure 17. Since the evaluation was 
done before the actual project, it was left out from the planning. 
 
Figure 17. PDCA model also known as Deming circle. (Moen & Clifford) 
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8.1.1 Design 
During the design phase, an additional analysis on the goals and requirements was 
made. The current state of the environment and organization were also important 
inputs in order to select the proper deployment model and management options for 
the to-be state. The primary outcome of the phase was a design document of the en-
vironment that defined how the integration would be implemented and how the 
specific elements would be configured. Licensing requirements were measured 
based on the amount of servers in active use and what the transition time for servers 
would be to use the licensed features.  
8.1.2 Implementation and Pilot Deployment 
In the implementation and pilot deployment phase, the solution was installed to ex-
isting AD infrastructure. Applications were installed to management servers and ad-
ministrative access was configured based on decision made in the projects design 
phase and in AD design. The main result of the phase was to produce a stable plat-
form for the administrative team to start piloting the solution with a limited group of 
users and servers.  
Users for the pilot deployment were selected based on their duties and access level. 
For maximizing the yield from centralized authentication, all selected users were 
from the administrative team and from the Qvantel on-duty team responsible for all 
the production systems outside normal office hours. These two user groups were se-
lected based on two clear facts: 
 Access to all servers 
 Motivation to use only one account for all systems 
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In addition, a third group of users was selected from the development teams to pro-
vide insight to what rights and roles needed to be defined and implemented. Devel-
opment team that was working on a project where three new server environments 
were installed. The development team provided the most valuable experience in the 
actual rights management with Centrify, and the knowledge was later capitalized in 
the rollout phase when rights and roles were defined and tested. During the piloting 
phase, an iterative cycle was used to develop the authorization roles that would 
eventually provide all the needed access and execution rights that were needed 
without undermining the security of systems. 
The servers for the pilot were running Oracle Enterprise Linux, and no Solaris servers 
were in active use during the pilot. That did not turn out to be a major issue in the 
rollout since the amount of Solaris servers was marginal. Due to that, the Solaris 
servers were handled case by case. 
8.1.3 Testing and validation 
Testing was conducted as an ongoing process during the pilot. Anytime the pilot us-
ers gave feedback, adaptations and fixes were implemented. Centrify features 
needed to provide core functionality, security hardening and user management. 
Those were tested as a whole by the system administrator team.  
The testing lacked clear structure and not as organized it should have been, which 
had an effect on the initial deployment. This was due to lack of deep knowledge on 
the product and a clear plan what needed to be tested.  In general, tests were made 
to solve any issues that were raised by the members of the pilot and the team in 
charge of the deployment. 
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8.1.4 Roll-Out 
Rollout plans were created after sufficient testing, and verification with one develop-
ment team was done during the pilot. The server infrastructure was segmented into 
logical entities and a rollout plan was created for them. Entities were defined from 
already running customer environments and internal company servers. Rollout 
phases themselves consisted of their own projects that contained the same principal 
phases planning, deployment, and roll-out. 
8.1.5 Management and Evolution 
Before selecting Centrify solution to be used as the solution for the system integra-
tion it was defined that administrative tasks should follow the guidelines of Windows 
environment. Best practices and known ways of working with AD are extensively doc-
umented. Using those principal guidelines in management of an environment such as 
Qvantel’s would prove to be efficient and time saving.  
Evolution was not planned beyond server environment roll-out since the need was 
only to provide a solid base for centralized authentication solution. Centrify provides 
a wide variety of integration tools to applications that could be used to extend the 
AD data to web applications, mobile device management and such. 
8.2 Technical planning 
8.2.1 Planning Active Directory changes  
Planning the AD to meet the requirements of Centrify, the deployment was based on 
information gathered from Centrify and Microsoft documentation. As a general prin-
ciple, it was defined that nothing should be placed into the root level of the domain 
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and Centrify data container should not be placed in any active OU or container. Fi-
gure 18 illustrates the relation of high level OUs. Centrify OU contains all the infor-
mation written and accessed by the Centrify applications. Subsidiaries have child OUs 
that contain users, groups and computers for that specific subsidiary.  
domain.com
Subsidiary 01
Domain Controllers
AD Sites
Subnets
Subsidiary 02Centrify
 
Figure 18. AD hierarchy in a high level. 
Access rights regarding AD were planned following normal Windows practices. The 
initial planning of resources for the management team was at a very high level since 
there were no pressing requirements that would have forced the separation of ad-
ministrative access rights between different OUs. Since the planning was made using 
the best practices, more detailed access management was very easily planned and 
implemented later on. 
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8.2.2 Planning Centrify Zones 
Zones planning was clear from the start since the structure was similar to AD logical 
structure at a high-level. The author reflected the administrative duties against the 
hierarchical zones structure described in the documentation and explained in chap-
ter 6.1 of this thesis. Figure 19 illustrates the high-level plan of the logical structure. 
Global zone is the highest level that contains the information needed in all environ-
ments such as global administrative accounts and roles. The author also wanted to 
separate office IT environment from our private cloud platform in the logical struc-
ture so we planned separate parent zones for those. Office zone contains all users, 
roles and computers for office environment and Servers zone was dedicated to our 
private cloud resources. All computer objects were designed to reside in each ten-
ant’s zone and no computer objects were deployed to parent zones.  
8.2.3 User provisioning 
To enhance the security in the access management it was decided to differentiate ac-
counts used in the office system and in our private cloud platform. There was a re-
quirement that UID needed to persist throughout the hierarchy and that was estab-
lished by planning the provisioning of all users of the Servers zone and its child zones 
to the parent zone. GID did not need to be persistent since the resources used in the 
customer zones were unique to the customer. Therefore, groups provisioning was 
designed so that groups specific to the tenant were provisioned to the respective 
zone only. Exceptions were groups that were somehow related to system manage-
ment and those were provisioned based on the actual need during implementation. 
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Servers Zone
Description: Datacenter 
servers, users and groups
UID: 5200
Global Zone
Global Centrify Parent 
Zone
Global Zone
Description: Global 
Centrify Par nt Zon
UID: 56000
Roles
Global Admin 
Rolegroups
Provisioning
Global 
administrators
Roles
Office Roles
Example Role
RoleWorkstationAc
cess
Provisioning
All human user 
accounts from 
Users OU
Matti Meikäläinen
Basic User account. Lastname + 
first letter of firstname. I.e. 
matmei
Domain.com
Centrify DirectControl
Centrify Zone 
Provisioning Agent
All users that can 
access Centrify 
managed servers
Roles that need 
to be available in 
all zones
Child zone 01
Servers specific 
for this child
Access roles 
specific for this 
child
Office Zone
Description: Office 
computers, Users and 
Groups
UID: 43000
 
Figure 19. Initial plan for Centrify Zones. 
8.2.4 Client deployment 
New servers 
Qvantel had an automated system for server deployment. Client installation for new 
servers was planned to be implemented in the deployment scripts. This was a logical 
choice since we wanted to further automate our operations and server deployment. 
Deploying client to fresh installs did not exhibit any problems even when imple-
mented. 
Existing servers 
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Client deployment to the existing servers was recognized as one of the most chal-
lenging steps in the project so a great deal of effort was put into planning. The serv-
ers in Qvantel platforms were deployed in a highly segmented network infrastructure 
and manual installation of the clients to over 200 servers was not an efficient way for 
the deployment. The use of Deployment Manager was the obvious choice for doing 
the deployments and that decision brought requirements that needed to be handled. 
 SSH access from the Deployment Manager to servers 
 AD domain needed to be found from DNS 
 Access rights to servers defined in Deployment Manager 
Using the Deployment Manager also presented security requirements that needed to 
be included in the planning. Deployment Manager has the ability to store account 
credentials for UNIX login users and services accounts, including the password for 
each managed computer, in the Deployment Manager database. The passwords are 
encrypted with the access token of the AD user who adds computers to Deployment 
Manager. Therefore, for security purposes the following requirements were pre-
sented: 
 Deployment Manager would not be executed from a laptop. Instead, a server 
inside our infrastructure shall be used.  
 No shared accounts would be used to operate the application. 
 A strong password and password enforcement policies needed to be de-
ployed for users allowed to add computer information using Deployment 
Manager. 
Because AD had just been implemented to our network, DNS provided by the DCs 
was not used on our Linux and Solaris server. During the planning, it was decided to 
make the DNS changes in phases during the client deployment. Deployment Manager 
was planned to be installed on a Windows server with all other Centrify applications 
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and that server was to be used as a management server. After designating the man-
agement server, firewall rules were planned regarding the deployment.  
8.2.5 Firewall rules 
Figure 20 illustrates the primary firewall changes that needed planning regarding the 
deployment. As stated in chapter 8.2.4, in addition to AD communications, additional 
openings were needed. These were ssh port tcp/22 to enable Deployment Manager 
operations on company servers. Investigations were made regarding the list of ports 
in Table 4, and ports that were not needed were left out the of the communication 
between Linux clients and AD. 
 Centrify Management Server
ssh  
AD ports
Subnet
 
Figure 20. Access through firewall. 
When communicating with servers that located in DMZ networks the communication 
to AD should be limited by placing RODC in an isolated network. The RODCs would 
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then handle the authentication from the servers in DMZ networks. The risk was 
acknowledged during the planning; however, due to the nature of our services and 
network infrastructure RODCs were not implement during the initial deployment but 
the possibility to implement them in a later phase was not dismissed.  
By default, AD replication remote procedure calls (RPC) occur dynamically over an 
available port through the RPC Endpoint Mapper (RPCSS) by using port 135. Dynamic 
AD RPC traffic was restricted to a specific port using Microsoft knowledge base arti-
cle KB224196. This kind of traffic happens between DCs and should be taken into 
consideration when deploying additional DCs or RODCs. 
Table 4. AD port requirements. (Microsoft, 2014) 
Protocol and Port AD and AD DS Usage Type of traffic 
TCP and UDP 389 Directory, Replication, User and 
Computer Authentication, 
Group Policy, Trusts 
LDAP 
TCP 636 Directory, Replication, User and 
Computer Authentication, 
Group Policy, Trusts 
LDAP SSL 
TCP 3268 Directory, Replication, User and 
Computer Authentication, 
Group Policy, Trusts 
LDAP GC 
TCP 3269 Directory, Replication, User and 
Computer Authentication, 
Group Policy, Trusts 
LDAP GC SSL 
TCP and UDP 88 User and Computer Authentica-
tion, Forest Level Trusts 
Kerberos 
TCP and UDP 53 User and Computer Authentica-
tion, Name Resolution, Trusts 
DNS 
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TCP and UDP 445 Replication, User and Computer 
Authentication, Group Policy, 
Trusts 
SMB,CIFS,SMB2, DFSN, 
LSARPC, NbtSS, 
NetLogonR, SamR, SrvSvc 
TCP 25 Replication SMTP 
TCP 135 Replication RPC, EPM 
TCP Dynamic Replication, User and Computer 
Authentication, Group Policy, 
Trusts 
RPC, DCOM, EPM, 
DRSUAPI, NetLogonR, 
SamR, FRS 
TCP 5722 File Replication RPC, DFSR (SYSVOL) 
UDP 123 Windows Time, Trusts Windows Time 
TCP and UDP 464 Replication, User and Computer 
Authentication, Trusts 
Kerberos change/set pass-
word 
UDP Dynamic Group Policy DCOM, RPC, EPM 
UDP 138 DFS, Group Policy DFSN, NetLogon, NetBIOS 
Datagram Service 
TCP 9389 AD DS Web Services SOAP 
UDP 67 and UDP 
2535 
DHCP 
 
DHCP, MADCAP 
UDP 137 User and Computer Authentica-
tion, 
NetLogon, NetBIOS Name 
Resolution 
TCP 139 User and Computer Authentica-
tion, Replication 
DFSN, NetBIOS Session 
Service, NetLogon 
 
8.2.6 Migration of existing users and rights 
The solution enables migration of existing users to AD with rights, and that is estab-
lished by analyzing configuration files on client servers. However, early on a decision 
was made not to import any of the existing users. Administrative accounts used in 
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the environments were left as they are to provide a backup in case problems were 
encountered with AD authentication. All other accounts were planned to be re-
moved after a transition period when it was confirmed that duties could be handled 
using the new AD accounts with corrects access rights.  
8.2.7 Access rights 
Administrative access rights 
By default, normal users do not have enough rights to do many of the operations 
Centrify requires to function. Access rights are managed through AD with native tools 
like Active Directory Users and Groups (ADUC) or the new Active Directory Adminis-
trative Center (ADAC). Regarding administrative access, that much effort was not al-
located into planning it since the management team was not so large and the team 
members had to operate in many different areas, which in a large company would be 
done in separate teams. A decision was made to come back to this after the imple-
mentation was ready and some experience was gathered in the management tasks. 
It should be noted that administration access is managed by AD so the segregation of 
administrative duties would not present challenges when implemented if required. 
Access roles, authorization roles and rights 
When the planning of the deployment was started, extensive knowledge, how devel-
opers were actually using the servers was not acquired. Because of that, access rights 
were not planned on a desired level. There was a vision how access rights were 
meant to be used; however, planning and implementation was limited by our 
knowledge in the possibilities of DirectAuthorize. The Access rights were planned 
based on the vision what was wanted and what would be the best solution for the 
environment and the team did not focus on whether those would be possible to im-
plement with Centrify. 
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9 IMPLEMENTATION 
9.1 Hierarchical zone structure 
The solution relied on hierarchical zones structure of Centrify management. It be-
came clear, based on planning that using two main zones to separate operational en-
vironments from our office environment was the best option. Office appliances and 
workstations were placed in their own zone under the Global zone and operational 
servers were placed in their own zone structure. Both branches were connected via 
Global zone that enables the adding, removal and modification of objects for both 
branches from one point with a minimal administrative effort.  
The operational zone contains child zones named after the customer using prede-
fined naming convention. The environment contained servers, command rights, com-
puter authorization role groups, authorization roles and configuration. All user ac-
counts were provisioned to Operational zone. That way the users had the same basic 
settings (GID, shell, etc.) in all environments joined to AD with Centrify. Only cus-
tomer environment specific groups were provisioned to the corresponding customer 
zone using provisioning groups. 
9.2 Active Directory configuration 
AD structure was prepared to meet the requirements acquired during the planning 
phase. The logical structure needed to provide a clear separation of Qvantel Group 
60 
 
 
companies (Qvantel Finland, Qvantel India, and so on) for the administrators to man-
age different authorization scenarios with the least amount of effort. During the time 
of planning there was no actual need to separate production and office environ-
ments to different domains in the AD forest but the implementation was carried out 
keeping in mind that in the future the forest could contain more than one domain.  
9.2.1 Organizational Units 
Centrify stores the information and configuration in AD and for that, it needed a loca-
tion. Centrify can store the data anywhere in the AD, however, it was recommended 
by Centrify (Centrify Corporation, 2012, p. 38) that a separate high-level OU was cre-
ated especially for Centrify and placed at root. Consolidating all UNIX data under one 
high-level OU-structure saves administrative effort in the day-to-day operations 
when special instructions were not needed for normal OU management. It also ena-
bled separation of duties without affecting the rights in other OUs.  
OUs were added to the domain for Centrify data, groups, users, servers and work-
stations to form a base for the structure. Figure 21 shows an obfuscated sample of 
the logical structure that was implemented. The implementation had two basic de-
sign rules that were followed: 
1. Centrify data is stored outside any Company structure (Centrify UNIX). The 
contents of the Centrify OU structure are not modified manually but only by 
Centrify applications, and the functionality is not transparent to the user. 
2. Every subsidiary of Qvantel Oy has its own OU structure that contains all the 
resources that the company owns. That includes groups, computers and us-
ers. 
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Regarding Centrify functionality, security access delegation was made to Centrify 
UNIX OU to allow Centrify ZPA to make modifications to the parent OU and all de-
scendant objects. This is required for the provisioning application to read and write 
objects and object attributes to AD.  
 
Figure 21. Active Directory logical structure. 
9.3 Users, groups and rights management 
At start the project access rights management was outlined to follow Microsoft’s 
best practices. The model was defined to be used in Windows environments and that 
needed some level of planning how a successful implementation could be achieved 
in a mixed environment.  
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Users were created in an AD OU that had all the account used in operational environ-
ments and users were then provisioned to Centrify hierarchical structure using ZPA. 
Initially, the users did not have access to any system and all access rights were 
granted using company access management process where a supervisor defines the 
role of a user and access rights are provisioned by system administrators. 
In the model (Figure 22), every resource has its own AD security group named in a 
manner that reflects the resource.  
 Resources in this context can be databases, file shares, servers or some other 
module that contain authentication or functionality that need to be included 
in a role. 
 Resource groups are standard AD security groups that relate to the specific 
resource. A resource can have multiple groups relating to it if there are differ-
ent access levels such as read, modify or full access. However, one resource 
group should not be tied to multiple resources. 
 Role groups are also standard AD security groups. They contain all the users 
for a specific role like Financial, HR or IT. In addition to users, role groups are 
members of the resource groups. The resource groups joined in the role de-
pend on the role and its functions. 
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Resource Group
Resource Group
User Role Group
User Role Resource Groups Resources
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a Role group
Role group is 
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Figure 22. Access rights delegation. 
9.3.1 First stage: Resource management in mixed environment 
At first, some mistakes were made when Windows practices were followed quite lit-
erally in Centrify. That resulted in an excessive amount of security groups since re-
source groups were created for every right for a server (Table 5), and the same pat-
tern was repeated for 20-30 servers resulting in over a hundred security groups for 
resources. 
Table 5. Resource groups for a server. 
Server 1 
Group Description 
RES_Server1_Login Resource group to allow ssh login to the server. 
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RES_Server1_app1 Resource group to allow execution of sudo commands for 
app1. 
RES_Server1_app2 Resource group to allow execution of sudo commands for 
app2 
RES_Server1_PG_group1 Resource group to do a primary group override for a user. 
 
This was mainly because at the time there was significant time pressure to get cen-
tralized authentication implemented and that resulted in decisions that were quick 
and dirty since there was not enough experience on the product and in its testing. In 
this model, use of sudo was familiar to all in the administrative team and the decision 
was made to use sudo until a proper study was made into using DirectAuthorize. 
Centrify has the ability to write /etc/sudoers configuration centrally through GPO and 
it was used to configure resource groups to allow specific command in our servers. 
As a result, the project was able to move forward in although there were problems to 
be solved before existing servers could be expand to existing servers in our environ-
ment. Figure 23 illustrates the implementation using AD security groups and 
/etc/sudoers. 
1. Users were members in a role group, which was a member of resources (2). 
2. Resources contained all needed rights for the role. 
3. Resources were configured to a server using GPO or Centrify DirectManage 
where configuration was made to the computer object. 
4. Access rights for specified role were deployed to server sudoer’s configura-
tion or any other configuration file that was specified i.e.  
/etc/centrifydc/group.ovr for group manipulation for the role in this example. 
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RoleDevs Resources
resServer1PGdevs
resServer1app1
resServer1app2
Server1
/etc/sudoers:
%resServer1app1 app1 = NOPASSWD: /app/app1
%resServer1app2 app2 = NOPASSWD: /app/app2
/etc/centrifydc/group.ovr:
+@resServer1PGdevs::::12345::
RoleDevs Resources Server2
/etc/sudoers:
%resServer2app1 app1 = NOPASSWD: /app/app1
%resServer2app2 app2 = NOPASSWD: /app/app2
/etc/centrifydc/group.ovr:
+@resServer2PGdevs::::12345::
resServer1login
Login rights
Login rights
resServer2PGdevs
resServer2app1
resServer2app2
resServer2login
 
Figure 23. First stage of implementation. 
Since sudo is managed via sudoers file, which is a local file in a server and cannot be 
managed centrally, several GPOs had to be created and those were limited to a sub-
set of servers in an OU using security groups. That meant significant amount of mi-
cromanagement and things that needed to be remembered e.g. resource groups, 
GPO configuration, limiting GPOs, binding roles to resources. This work needed to be 
done when a new server was added or a server was removed. 
9.3.2 Second stage: Rights management through DirectAuthorize 
Once operational status was established using the quick and dirty solution described 
in the previous chapter, the development of a more stable solution was started so 
that the administrators could perform access management with a minimal adminis-
trative effort. That meant more testing of granular access and rights management 
functionality provided by the DirectAuthorize. Centrify client setup includes binaries 
for the DirectAuthorize itself and also a Centrify customized package of OpenSSH 
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which was not installed to our environment because that had a negative effect to our 
existing patch management process. 
It was unclear what DirectAuthorize functionality required the custom OpenSSH to 
be installed to servers. Testing of dzdo with different rights and configurations soon 
revealed that all needed functionalities could be used without the custom OpenSSH 
package. As a result, design work was started to completely change the implemented 
access and rights management with Centrify. As an extra challenge planning needed 
to be done on how the already implemented solutions could be migrated without 
any major downtimes. A positive feature in this was that only internal users were us-
ing the systems so scheduling and planning such maintenance were done with rea-
sonable effort and the impact was not that critical if some problems were discov-
ered. 
The new design focused on minimizing administrative effort when changes occur and 
once the initial work was done, the management would not require a great amount 
of time and training compared to the previous state. Authorization roles described in 
chapter 6.5 were used with computer authorization roles (6.3) to efficiently delegate 
all needed rights for users in the servers. A huge improvement to the earlier imple-
mentation was the high granulation of access rights and with this method all the 
main features of Centrify could be harness to our benefit. The second iteration is vis-
ualized in Figure 24. 
1. Users are members in AD role groups. 
2. Role groups are members in specific resource groups that are used in situa-
tions where a functionality was wanted to achieve, which cannot be done any 
other way like primary UID, or GID overrides which are used in the figure. 
3. Authorization roles were built in Direct Access Manager that are like 
toolboxes for a specific group of people. The role contains all the required 
commands and PAM roles that are needed. 
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4. AD role group (1) and authorization role (3) are linked in computer authoriza-
tion group. One AD role can be linked to multiple computer groups with 
proper authorization roles and the access rights are automatically distributed 
to all servers that are members of the specific computer groups. 
5. As a result, proper access management that can be scaled with ease. 
 
Figure 24. Rethinking access management. 
9.3.3 Challenges with sudo to dzdo 
Moving away from sudo to dzdo was slightly problematic since the two applications 
were not functioning identically. Centrify states in their documentation that dzdo 
should be a replacement for sudo but it was not. There are fundamental differences 
in how the application handles certain syntaxes used in scripts. Behavior is different 
in some cases because of a bug in sudo version that dzdo is based on. After lengthy 
discussions in with Centrify support, they acknowledged the bug and provided the 
following workaround: 
WebBackendServers
RoleDevs
WebDevs
service crond 
(start|restart|s
top|status)
bundle update
kill -HUP 
(httpd|nginx)
service crond 
(start|restart|s
top|status)
12
3
4 WebFrontendServers
WebTestingServers
Resources
5resServer1PGdev
resServer2PGdev
resServer3PGdev
...
/etc/centrifydc/group.ovr
kill -HUP 
(httpd|nginx)
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[user@server]# sudo -iu testuser /bin/sh -c "echo test" 
test  
 
[user@server]# dzdo -iu testuser "/bin/sh -c "echo test"" 
(empty output)  
 
Workaround is to use additional single quotes. 
[user@server]# dzdo -iu testuser "/bin/sh -c 'echo test'" 
test 
 
Also, dzdo differs from sudo so that it wants the first command as a single parameter 
and the rest of the command line as the second parameter. An example illustrates 
this: 
[user@server ~]$ dzdo -i -u web cd "/tmp && pwd; id -nu; umask 
-S | grep -q \"g=rwx\" && echo ok"  
/tmp 
web 
ok 
The developers noticed challenges with dzdo quickly when automated scripts ceased 
to function properly and workarounds were implemented. All of the problems were 
somehow related to escaping of quotes or processing parameters of the command 
like explained above. Further problems in the behavior of dzdo have not been discov-
ered after running the solution in production for almost two years.  
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10 RESULTS 
10.1 Overall experience 
Overall, the project was a success and it provided the administrative team tools to 
manage large amounts of users with a reasonable effort. The amount of configura-
tion work at first was overwhelming due to misinformation and lack of experience, 
however, eventually solutions were found to solve the problems when the team got 
familiar with the new products. In total, the project took 1.5 calendar years to see 
through since the experts were not dedicated only to this project and there was no 
pressure to get it completed in a tight time frame. This chapter presents the results 
gained and findings made during the project. 
10.2 Experiences from the planning 
Initially, the vision was clear what achievement was wanted in the end. The author 
had years of experience from Windows access management and infrastructure archi-
tecture which in the author’s opinion was far ahead what could be achieved using 
only Linux systems in terms of easy access management. The challenge in planning 
was the Centrify product and the lack of knowledge regarding it. How did it need to 
be integrated? Could it do what was done with Windows? How did the rights man-
agement actually work with our server infrastructure? There were many questions 
floating around and there were little facts to provide the answers. The decision to 
follow the same ideology used in Windows environments was the supporting idea 
from the beginning of the planning and that paid off in the end.  
The planning eventually presented two major challenges that were the role access 
planning and the existing environment rollout. It was difficult to plan the access roles 
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at first since the administration team did not have a good visibility what the develop-
ers were actually doing in the environment and what kind of access rights were re-
quired, which resulted in planning the access rights at quite a high level and many 
adjustments were made during and after rollout. A better understanding of devel-
oper activities would have helped a great deal when designing access roles. 
Lack of competence regarding Centrify Suite was a major factor that affected the en-
tire project in addition to just planning. No experience existed on the product or its 
capabilities in the scale that was visioned.  The software provider offers face-to-face 
trainings and web trainings and the author highly recommends participating in a 
training before planning the deployment because it saves plenty of time and effort. 
10.3 Implementation challenge 
Naturally, the challenges faced during the planning phase affected the implementa-
tion by extending the project life span. Implementation was carried out in iterations 
since features and changes needed to be tested in a real environment with real us-
ers. Some level of testing was done on the functionality before deploying the soft-
ware, however, most of the functionality regarding scripts and file system accesses 
was not tested during initial implementation. Since a new infrastructure was being 
built for a client at the same time, it proved to ease the implementation phase since 
the test could be done at the same time as building the solution in a new environ-
ment that was not in production during the implementation. That way there was no 
danger for data being destroyed or compromised or people being blocked from do-
ing their work. With the first environment, the iterative approach was excellent for 
gathering experience and practices that were capitalized during deployment to exist-
ing environments.  
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The second set was quite similar to the first, and many of the configuration practices 
adapted in the iterative phases could be used. Since this was the first actual deploy-
ment to a group of servers that were in production, development had to be done to 
our process to include all details that would have somehow affected the deployment 
and applications in production. Lessons were learned from our initial installations 
and that was capitalized amazingly well when planning the access roles. At the same 
time, roles were simplified even more; thus, access management would be simple; 
however, roles were still providing the needed level in access segregation.  
The last big push included the oldest part of the managed environment and it con-
tained the most challenges since the infrastructure was quite old. It had remnants of 
a time when processes were not followed properly and practices were under devel-
oped. Adaptations were made on methods from the previous two stints and the solu-
tion was gradually deployed. Because there were servers that were not based on our 
server templates problems were faced when deploying configurations and settings. 
There were different Linux distributions that did not have the same configuration 
files in use and that resulted in unwanted functionality. Most problems were faced 
with servers that were used by developers for testing and staging. On those comput-
ers, users had various access configurations in place. The negative functionality of 
the legacy servers resulted in a new project to replace all of the outdated servers 
with new installations that were based on managed template. This was the most 
time consuming of all deployment phases while having significant pressure due to 
other projects. 
10.4 Influence to access management 
A centralized solution for access management provided a way to integrate the mixed 
environment into a centralized authentication and administration point that pro-
vided more than access management. The solution brought adherence to company 
security policy that required extensive effort to uphold earlier. It also introduced 
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lower costs through economies of scale and automation that were the primary goals 
in the beginning of the project. Simple access management tasks did not show a 
great improvement in the time spent to resolve them; however, in a situation where 
a large amount of access rights had to be delegated, the solutions quickly showed 
their worth. Especially, when new environments are created, most of the access 
management effort is done in the configuration phase and afterwards the manage-
ment is trivial work that can be assigned to typical first or second tier experts. This 
frees the system administration team to other tasks that require that level of exper-
tise.  
In chapter 7.4, the author studied the administrative effort that was allocated to ac-
cess management duties and the research goal of this thesis was to see what implica-
tions the solutions would have to management costs and resource usage. The author 
gained an extensive amount of experience in managing the access rights requests 
since its main responsibility resided on him. The tasks that contained access requests 
and the configuration was already implemented were trivial after the solution imple-
mentation regardless of how many users or access rights were to be delegated. The 
time spent varied from five to 15 minutes, which was significantly shorter than be-
fore. After an environment reaches a level of maturity where configuration effort is 
almost nonexistent, the operational cost will be very small and the solution starts to 
redeem the capital expenditure.  
Without the centralized authentication solution, the company would have needed an 
extensive amount of administrative effort to cope with the rapid growth. When the 
project started there were around 100 employees working in the company and most 
of them had some level of access to servers now managed by the solution. Since then 
the company has grown to over 250 employees and has external users that also need 
to be managed. The amount of servers has grown at an average rate of 100 servers 
per year. In the light of these numbers, it very easy to conclude that without a cen-
tralized authentication solution it would have been incredibly difficult to adapt to the 
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workload and that would have meant additional recruitment for access management 
tasks.  
Another aspect is the ever-growing information security awareness that has been 
fueled by the major events in the recent years like Snowden leaks and major 
breaches in security like Target and Sony cases. Customers in the telecommunica-
tions sector have always had a high level of information security awareness; how-
ever, they have raised the bar to a new level. To deal with audits the organization 
must have the capability to present that user and access management are handled 
systematically and securely. Segregation of duties is necessary, and there needs to be 
a capability to show evidence that it is attended to. Centrify solution provides excel-
lent tools for the company to comply with the requirements received from custom-
ers and regulation.  
10.5 Further development 
This thesis focused on bringing Centrify IAM solution in the organization’s infrastruc-
ture to enhance the access management. The focus of the project was the deploy-
ment and reaching a steady state in operations. Since then reviews have been done 
on other features that the supplier is offering to expand the capabilities and one of 
the most interesting features is the audit feature presented in the Enterprise edition 
of Centrify Suite. The audit capabilities in our environment should be enhanced, and 
the audit feature would probably be a suitable addition to our monitoring capability.  
Another property, which the infrastructure is lacking regarding access management, 
is reporting. Centrify suite has built-in reporting features; however, to fully gain the 
potential from the reports they need to be automated and formatted to serve the 
purpose. Reports could be sent to supervisors automatically from Centrify for access 
rights review without the need for manual actions.  
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Automatic access downgrade would be a feature worth investigating. If a user has 
not used a specific access, it would send notifications to the user that access rights 
will be downgraded if user is not using them. After a specified time, the access right 
for that system would be set to an agreed minimum or removed to prevent users 
from “collecting” unneeded access rights.  
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